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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a longitudinal case study examining why and how commercial banks 
sought to integrate sustainability issues into their project finance operations between 2003 and 
2008. We study the evolution of a set of influential environmental and social risk management 
guidelines for project finance - the Equator Principles (EP) - and the simultaneous 
structuration of a field around these guidelines focused on the issue of socially accountable 
project finance. The case is theoretically framed using Hoffman’s (1999) concept of an issue-
based field and associated conceptualisations of the role of internal and external (social) 
movements in the structuration of these fields. The structuration of the issue-based field 
studied is shown to encompass a dynamic, contested process involving extensive interactions 
between a non-governmental organization (NGO) movement and a commercial bank 
movement. We unveil how the conflicting, collective rationales and actions of both 
movements fuelled the structuration process and facilitated an evolution in the social 
accountability of commercial banks. While prior work sees little potential for civil society 
actors to engage with and move corporate social responsibility and reporting in a more 
challenging direction, we reveal how the NGO movement evoked a progression in social 
responsibility and reporting in a sector that had previously shown little inclination to address 
its wider social accountability. Drawing on our case analysis, we theorize how issue-based 
fields cohere and crystallise, particularly how they build an institutional infrastructure based 
upon the infrastructure of the mature field which they straddle and which the relevant issue 
impacts upon. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the US Government’s Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission indicated that one of its main causes was a collapse in accountability among some of the 
world’s largest financial institutions. The Commission concluded that many industry leaders were 
lulled into taking unwarranted risks that ended up having devastating social consequences (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2012; Roberts & Jones, 2009). As a result, increased scrutiny of financial 
institutions’ social licence to operate emerged, leading to escalating interest in examining their social 
accountability (Hopwood, 2009; McSweeney, 2009). While the financial crisis highlighted the adverse 
direct social impacts of certain financial sector activities, the sector’s core lending and investment 
practices have long been seen to have indirect social (and environmental) consequences, particularly 
with respect to decisions to lend to or invest in entities whose operations may have damaging impacts 
on society and/or the environment (Scholtens, 2006, 2009). Although efforts to consider social and 
environmental impacts within lending and investment practices existed prior to the financial crisis 
(Coulson & O’Sullivan, 2014; Dejean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; Scholtens, 2006, 2009), we are limited in 
our understanding of the dynamics of these processes, such as why and how these processes emerged, 
how actors within and outside the financial sector interacted and influenced these processes, and the 
nature and extent of the institutional change they effected. In particular, we know little about the 
extent to which such change processes advanced social accountability in the financial sector.  
 
This study attends to these change dynamics, and their effects. It investigates why and how 
commercial banks began to address sustainability issues in their ‘project finance’1 operations from 
2003 onwards and how this was catalysed by non-governmental organization (NGO) campaigns 
promoting socially accountable finance. It further examines the effects these processes had on the 
project finance field and on commercial bank social accountability; particularly the evolution in the 
nature of commercial bank reporting on their environmental and social risk assessment processes. 
Specifically, we present a longitudinal case study examining the evolution and adoption of the Equator 
Principles (EP), a suite of environmental and social risk management guidelines for commercial 
banks’ project finance activities. The Principles represent one of the most significant social 
accountability initiatives to have emerged within financial markets in the past decade. We examine the 
                                                          
1
 Project finance is a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, 
both as the source of repayment and as security for the exposure to default. It can involve the financing of the construction of 
a new capital installation, or the refinancing of an existing installation, with or without improvements. The borrower is 
usually a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) which is not permitted to perform any function other than developing, owning and 
operating the financed installation. As a consequence, the repayment depends primarily on the project’s cash flow and on the 
collateral value of the project’s assets (Equator Principles II, 2006). 
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role of an NGO movement operating outside the mature project finance field and the role of a 
commercial bank movement from within this field in the structuration of a separate, but related, field 
focused on the issue of socially accountable finance – what we term “the Equator Principles (EP) 
issue-based field”2. We simultaneously study how this process influenced how commercial banks 
adopting the Equator Principles (termed Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs)) addressed 
their social accountability
3
. The case is theoretically framed using Hoffman’s (1999) concept of an 
issue-based field and associated conceptualisations of the role of internal and external (social) 
movements in the structuration of fields formed around key issues. 
Our analysis unveils how the conflicting collective rationales and actions of the NGO and 
Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) movements regarding the issue of socially accountable 
project finance shaped the Equator Principles (EP) issue-based field structuration process and an 
ensuing evolution in EPFI social accountability.
4
 We offer a nuanced understanding of the dynamic, 
political and contested interactions between NGO and corporate movements in the structuration of 
(sustainability-related) issue-based fields, especially in financial markets (see, King & Pearce, 2010), 
and of how these interactions influence the construction of “new categories and standards of 
accountability” (King & Pearce, 2010, p.260). Drawing on our analysis, we theorize how issue-based 
fields cohere and crystallise, particularly how they evolve an institutional infrastructure based upon the 
infrastructure of the existing mature field which they straddle, and which the issue impacts upon. 
 
We make a number of theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, the extant 
literature provides rich agentic accounts of field structuration which emphasise the interplay between 
the notions of institutional entrepreneur, (collective) rationality, logics, theorisation, framing and 
diffusion, resource mobilization, collective action, and social movements in dynamic processes of 
field evolution and change (see, Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008). However, this literature has predominantly focused on mature and emerging 
organizational fields (e.g. Ezzamel, Robson, & Stapleton, 2012; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
                                                          
2
 “An organizational field is composed of sets of institutions and networks of organizations that together constitute a 
recognizable area of life” (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004, p.657). An issue-based field is formed around an issue, as 
opposed to common technologies or industries, and brings disparate groups together (Hoffman, 1999). We view field 
structuration as an on-going, iterative process between field institutions/structures and agency which is reflected in the nature 
of the inter-organizational infrastructure (common meaning, relational and operational systems) that arises at field level 
(Scott, 2008). We elaborate on these notions in the theoretical framing in the next section. 
3
 Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) are financial institutions that adopted the Equator Principles. EPFIs also 
encompass all of those financial institutions that were the initiators and original developers of the Equator Principles (who 
also went on to adopt the Equator Principles). 
4 Please refer to Appendix I for a list of the acronyms used throughout the paper.  
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Lounsbury 2002; Dejean, Gond, & Leca, 2004; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Suddaby, Cooper, & 
Greenwood, 2007), with analyses of issue-based fields (Hoffman, 1999), and in particular how and 
why issue-based field structuration unfolds, remaining largely neglected. We contend that our focus on 
issue-based fields is important as it allows for a better understanding of how issues, in particular 
sustainability-related issues (in our case, the issue of socially accountable finance), affect and are 
affected by mature fields (here, the commercial bank project finance field), and of how separate fields 
can develop around specific issues yet continue to influence, and be influenced by the mature fields 
they impact on. Given the prominence of sustainability issues in contemporary societies and markets 
and the prevalence of a wide-range of issue-specific corporate sustainability principles, standards and 
codes of conduct throughout these contexts, we contend that it is necessary to analyse the emergence 
of such phenomena in depth in order to better comprehend how sustainability issues are infiltrating 
mature (corporate) fields and affecting corporate social accountability processes. Our analysis extends 
Hoffman’s (1999) study of how the issue of corporate environmentalism was interpreted and 
addressed by the US chemical industry and his theorisation of how fields develop around issues as 
opposed to markets or technologies. Moreover, we advance Hoffman’s (1999) conceptualisation of 
issue-based fields, as we theorize how and why they evolve an institutional infrastructure.  
 
Second, we progress prior work exploring the institutionalization processes surrounding 
corporate social reporting and accountability (see, for example, Archel, Husillos, & Spence, 2011; 
Bebbington, Kirk, & Larrinaga, 2012; Cooper & Owen, 2007; O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009). The 
case illustrates how environmental and social risk assessment became a component part of credit risk 
analysis in project finance, and how this risk assessment process came to be reported on as part of a 
collective (and individual) commercial bank effort to encourage environmental and social due 
diligence and socially responsible decision making. In particular, we show how the EP issue-based 
field structuration process initiated and advanced the production of accounts of banks’ efforts to 
categorise, quantify, monitor and avoid (where possible) environmental and social risks. This 
advances our understanding of the impact of field-level institutionalization processes on the evolution 
of corporate social and environmental reporting practices. We develop the findings of Archel et al. 
(2011) regarding the relationship dynamics that transpire in the structuration of a field focused on 
improving corporate accountability by extending and nuancing their insights into the role of activist 
stakeholders such as NGO movements in the structuration of this form of field. While aspects of our 
analysis concur with Archel et al.’s (2011) questioning of the potential for civil society actors to 
engage with and move corporate social responsibility and reporting in a more challenging direction 
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(see also, Cooper & Owen, 2007), we temper their conclusions by unveiling how a set of civil society 
actors (in the form of an NGO movement) evoked a progression in social responsibility and reporting 
in a sector that had previously shown little inclination to address its wider social accountability. 
 
Third, by unveiling the role of NGO and Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) 
movements in the Equator Principles issue-based field structuration process, we extend the literature 
on the effects of external and internal movements on institutional change and field structuration (e.g. 
Fligstein, 1996; Hensman, 2003; Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsch, 2003; van Wijk et. al., 2013). In 
particular, we advance aspects of van Wijk et al.’s (2013) study of the relationship between external 
movements and field incumbents in field structuration processes by providing insights into how the 
nature of the issue fuelling movement activity can influence these processes. Van Wijk et al. (2013) 
suggest that the ambiguity of an issue may contribute to more collaborative work between mature field 
incumbents and less powerful external movements in field structuration. However, while we reveal 
some collaborative efforts between the NGO and Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) 
movements, we find that the newness or ambiguity of an issue (such as socially accountable project 
finance) allows for a certain level of capture of the issue by powerful field incumbents who possess 
the necessary resources to develop issue-based institutions and practices which predominantly suit 
their preferred rationale and logics. This accentuates the combative as opposed to collaborative nature 
of the interactions between mature field incumbents and less powerful external movements in field 
structuration processes. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical 
framing adopted in the study. The research methods are subsequently outlined before a narrative of the 
case analysis is presented. This narrative traces the Equator Principles (EP) issue-based field 
structuration process between 2003 and 2008, emphasising the co-evolution of the field structuration 
process with advances in the social accountability of financial institutions adopting the Equator 
Principle. The paper proceeds to discuss the case analysis in the context of the theoretical framing and 
proposes a model of issue-based field structuration before concluding with some recommendations for 
future research. 
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THEORETICAL CONTEXT  
In order to frame our analysis of the structuration of the Equator Principles (EP) issue-based 
field, we mobilize Hoffman’s (1999) conception of issue-based fields alongside associated 
conceptualisations of the role of internal and external (social) movements in the structuration of such 
fields. This framing serves as a sensemaking device to focus our analysis and help develop our 
understanding, communication and theorisation of the issue-based field structuration process (Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2006). Below, we develop this framing by elaborating on the notion of issue-based fields 
and the role of collective sets of actors in the structuration of such fields. 
Characterising issue-based fields  
Organizational fields arise when organizations partake of a common meaning system and 
increase inter-organizational activity, information exchange and mutual awareness (Di Maggio & 
Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2008). Issue-based fields are distinct from common conceptions 
of organizational fields as they are “not formed around common technologies or common industries, 
but around issues that bring together various field constituents with disparate purposes” and interests 
(Hoffman, 1999, p. 352). Issues that become important to the interests and objectives of a specific 
collective define what the field is, making links that may not have previously been made. Hence, an 
issue-based field is not merely a collection of influential organizations; it is the centre of common 
channels of dialogue and discussion where competing interests continually negotiate over issue 
interpretation, and thus the institutions that will guide organizational behaviour (Hoffman, 1999). 
While not all field constituents will impact on negotiations over issue interpretation, this continual 
contestation and conflict can result in a process more akin to “institutional war than isomorphic 
dialogue” (Hoffman, 1999, p. 352) as fields become arenas of power relations in which interpretive 
struggles are constantly played out among a constellation of actors holding different perspectives 
underpinned by competing logics (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Wooten & 
Hoffman, 2008). These characteristics render issue-based fields contested and dynamic in contrast to 
the settled character commonly ascribed to organizational fields (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). 
While organizations can claim to be part of an issue-based field or not, their membership is 
ultimately defined through patterns of social interaction. Hence, if an organization chooses to 
disregard an emerging issue, for example, the issue of socially accountable project finance studied in 
this paper, others may crystallise the field formation process for them (Hoffman, 1999). This process 
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is often stimulated by social movement campaigns and/or protests raising awareness of a new issue or 
offering alternative framings of an existing issue.  
 
The role of internal and external (social) movements in issue-based field structuration 
Hoffman’s (1999) conceptualisation of issue-based fields as socially constructed, dynamic and 
political spaces is complemented by the social movement perspective as this perspective accentuates 
the role that collective action and contentiousness play in field structuration processes (King & Pearce, 
2010). Social movement theory highlights how actors work collectively to frame (societal) issues of 
concern and mobilize collective rationality, resources (which can be political, financial, 
organizational, cultural or symbolic) and action around these issues in order to induce field level 
change by altering embedded norms, values and practices (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Misangyi, 
Weaver, & Elms, 2008). Movements operate both within and outside (or on the periphery of) existing 
fields (Davis, Morrill, Rao, & Soule, 2008) and can have a profound effect on field structuration and 
change processes (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003), especially those focused around specific 
issues of societal concern such as corporate accountability (Hoffman, 1999; van Wijk et al., 2013). 
 
Actors within movements (re)construct collective rationales for institutional change in order to 
gain legitimacy or support for their preferred choice of action (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008). They mobilize narratives, rhetoric and analogies - for example, the publication of 
books, reports and media stories - to help frame and theorize their vision of change (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). Sense-making, interpretation, and the formulation of 
responses and motivating actions regarding an identified problem are embedded in framing processes 
(Benford & Snow, 2000), while theorisation highlights the failings of existing norms and practices and 
mobilizes understandable and compelling formats to “justify … new norms and practices in terms of 
moral or pragmatic considerations” (Dacin et al., 2002, p.48). Both framing and theorisation enable 
movements to “discredit the status quo and to present the alternative practices they are championing as 
necessary, valid and appropriate in ways that resonate with other field members” (Hardy & Maguire, 
2008, p. 208).  
 
Movements external to existing fields (external movements) tend to challenge dominant 
institutions and institutional arrangements. Given that individual actors at the periphery of fields may 
lack resources and influence (Hardy & Maguire, 2008), these external movements can develop as a 
vehicle of collective action, or “an accumulator of political power” (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008, 
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p.664) by pooling individual peripheral actor efforts and resources in order to better influence change 
within an existing field (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007; King, 2008). These “challenger” movements 
(Fligstein, 1996) often adopt a conflict-oriented character (but see, van Wijk et al., 2013) in order to 
disrupt, redefine or reframe existing arrangements using protests, boycotts and direct action aimed at 
dramatising perceived problems (Hoffman, 1999; King & Soule, 2007). By promoting an awareness of 
certain problems, they seek to subvert the taken-for-grantedness of existing arrangements and evoke 
controversy and debate within existing fields. This can provoke new patterns of interaction among 
organizations revolving around specific issues of concern or controversy (Soule, 2012).  
 
Internal movements seek to instigate change from within fields using established networks, 
resources and power structures. In contrast to external movements they “may be more likely to err on 
the conservative side” (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008, p.  660) by seeking to combine proposed new 
practices with prevailing models and arrangements in order to keep existing structures largely intact 
(Fligstein, 1996). Their individual participants are “interest-driven, aware and calculative” 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, p. 29) often occupying dominant “subject” positions as central actors 
within existing fields; thus providing the power and resources necessary to mobilize collective  
institutional action (Maguire et al., 2004; Rao et al., 2003; Sherer & Lee, 2002). Internal movements’ 
preference for incremental change means that they often oppose the organized attempts by external 
movements to change the extant institutional order (Rao et al., 2000). In some cases, in theorizing and 
enacting their (limited) vision of change they seek to assimilate the competing institutional rationale 
and logics of external movements within the prevailing logic (or logics) of the existing institutional 
environment (see, Thornton et al., 2012, pp. 165-167). Hence, internal movements often mobilize 
“rival coalitions of issue entrepreneurs” (Rao et al., 2000, p. 261) championing less radical frames of 
action. They enrol support by using established networks and resources to diffuse alternative, less 
radical practices to those proposed by external movements, and “[draw] on existing institutional 
elements and models to craft new systems” (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008, p.656). In doing so, they 
become institutional forces in themselves, acting as (political-cultural) vehicles “for diffusion, 
theorization, recombination and other institutional processes within fields” (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 
2008, p.656).  
Recent work suggests that collaborative efforts between external, challenger movements and 
incumbents in mature fields have, in practice, been neglected as avenues to affect field-level change 
(see, van Wijk et al., 2013). Van Wijk et al. (2013, p. 381) indicate that the nature of the issue 
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promoted by an external movement influences the interplay between the external movement and 
incumbents in the mature field to which the issue relates. They contend that ambiguous issues that are 
difficult to measure and attribute allow more room for external influence on an issue’s social 
construction. Issue ambiguity is seen to offer more options for incumbent involvement in the social 
construction of the issue and may facilitate collaboration between external and internal movements. 
This collaboration, under certain conditions, is seen as potentially leading to incremental as opposed to 
radical change in the mature field which the issue impacts upon. Moreover, collaboration between 
external and internal movements regarding an issue is deemed more likely where legal, governmental 
and market pressures support the external movements’ stance on an issue (Hoffman, 1999; van Wijk et 
al., 2013).  
We mobilize Hoffman’s (1999) issue-based field conception and (aspects of) social movement 
theory above to examine the role played by internal and external (social) movements in the 
structuration of an issue-based field centred around the EP. We seek to advance Hoffman’s 
conceptualisation of issue-based fields by unveiling how and why the EP issue-based field 
structuration process evolved an institutional infrastructure based upon the infrastructure of the mature 
project finance field it straddled, and which the issue of socially accountable finance impacted upon. 
Drawing on our analysis we construct a theoretical model of issue-based field structuration and unveil 
how the nature of the issue fuelling (social) movement activity influences the impact of external and 
internal movements on institutional change and issue-based field structuration. Prior to presenting this 
structuration process and accompanying theorisation, the following section specifies the research 
methods we adopted. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS  
Research design and data sources 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the complexities underlying the Equator 
Principles (EP) issue-based field structuration process (and associated developments in Equator 
Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) social accountability) we adopted a qualitative case-based 
research approach (Cooper & Morgan, 2008). This drew on twenty-eight semi-structured interviews 
conducted over a three year period involving thirty individual interviews with some of the most 
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prominent actors associated with the development and emergence of the Equator Principles
5
. This was 
supplemented with an extensive examination of the manifest (literal meaning) and latent (deep 
structural meaning) content of public and private publications relating to the development of the EP. 
The main objective of the study was to capture, interpret and represent the EP issue-based field 
structuration process drawing on the meanings key actors brought to the process (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000; Gephart, 2004). 
 
The case study was conducted in two phases between 2006 and 2009. The first phase was 
undertaken between June and December 2006 and sought NGO perspectives on how and why the EP 
were developed and how they were being implemented, especially the extent to which the process 
through which they emerged impacted on how the Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs)
6
 - 
the financial institutions that adopted the Equator Principles - addressed their social accountability. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine senior individuals from nine different NGOs that 
were members of BankTrack, an international coalition of NGOs that has closely monitored the 
development of the EP and the financing activities of the EPFIs. These interviewees were purposively 
chosen due to their historical and first-hand knowledge of NGO campaigns surrounding financial 
sector investments with significant social and environmental impacts in the run-up to and following 
the launch of the EP. Access to these interviewees was achieved through the first-named author’s 
contact with one of the NGOs from her previous work experience with UNEP-FI
7
, as well as through 
the BankTrack Coordinator. The BankTrack Coordinator was interviewed a second time in January 
2008 to gain more up-to-date NGO perspectives on the manner in which the EP had progressed since 
2006. This sought to capture the processual nature of the EP phenomenon and NGO perceptions of 
this process as it emerged over the 2003 to 2008 period (see Table 1).  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The second phase of the study was conducted between May 2007 and April 2008. This 
enrolled a cross-section of Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) perspectives on why and 
                                                          
5
 These comprised senior representatives from the two key actors in this process, the Equator Principles Financial Institutions 
(EPFIs) and NGOs, as well as other actors including an EP lawyer, EP consultant and two mining companies (an Australian 
gold mining company and a South African platinum mining company receiving project financing). 
6
 The EPFIs also encompass the financial institutions who were the initiators and original developers of the Equator 
Principles, all of whom subsequently adopted the Principles. 
7 UNEP-FI is the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI). This is a global initiative between 
UNEP and the financial services sector addressing sustainable finance issues.  
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how the EP were created and implemented between 2003 and 2008; and whether and if so, how, this 
affected the social accountability of the EPFIs. Access to ten different EPFIs was gained and included: 
1) Four ‘EP leader’ organizations, i.e. banks that were directly involved in developing the EP 
and adopted them when they were launched on June 4
th
, 2003. They comprised one Australian 
EPFI, one Dutch EPFI, one UK EPFI and one US EPFI. 
2) Three EP ‘early adopter’ organizations, i.e. banks that adopted the EP between June and 
October 2003. They comprised one (other) Dutch EPFI and two (other) UK EPFIs; and 
3) Three EP ‘late adopter’ organizations, i.e. banks that adopted the EP between November 2005 
and September 2007. They comprised one French EPFI, one Dutch/Belgian EPFI and one 
South African EPFI.  
 
The majority of interviewees from these EPFIs held senior social and environmental risk 
management positions. A chief operating officer, worldwide heads of sustainability, and executive and 
associate directors were also interviewed. Four interviewees were interviewed in one EPFI. In an 
additional EPFI two individuals were interviewed separately, while in two other EPFIs two individuals 
were interviewed together. Hence, while the total number of EPFI organizations included in the study 
was ten, the total number of individual interview meetings was fourteen, and the total number of 
interviewees in these fourteen meetings was sixteen (see Table 2).  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Prior to both the NGO and EPFI interviews, semi-structured interview guides were prepared 
comprising of questions that represented the core research themes or constructs informing the study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002). These NGO and EPFI “master-guides” were supplemented with 
organizational-specific guides/questions for each individual interview which were informed by 
company websites, reports, external media coverage and the first-named author’s observations of and 
informal interactions with some NGO and EPFI representatives at a number of corporate social 
responsibility/sustainable finance conferences and meetings over the course of 2005 to 2008.  
 
Eight of the ten NGO interviews were conducted face-to-face. The remaining two were 
conducted by telephone due to scheduling clashes. Twelve of the fourteen EPFI interviews were 
conducted face-to-face, while the interviews with the South African and US EPFIs were conducted by 
telephone due to the geographical distance from the researchers. In many cases there were numerous 
follow-up emails and telephone calls with interviewees providing further points of clarification that 
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were required following the interviews. All interviews lasted an average of one hour, were recorded on 
a MP3 player with the consent of the interviewees, and were fully transcribed for analysis purposes.  
 
Data analysis 
 
Transcript data 
In all phases of the research, interview transcripts were firstly carefully scrutinised while 
listening to the recorded interviews in an effort to identify and correct any errors that may have arisen 
during transcription. A set of codes based on the main question constructs and sub-questions contained 
in the interviews was then developed (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Ryan & Bernard, 2003). These 
comprised a mixture of data-driven and (initial) theory-driven codes (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 
2006) reflecting the key topics addressed in the interviews. The transcripts were then re-read (in some 
cases several times, often simultaneously re-listening to the interviews) and coded. In the process, any 
additional issues or codes that may not have arisen during the initial review of transcripts were noted.  
 
This descriptive coding assisted the cross-interview analysis and identification of core themes 
arising from the interview data; which acted as the basis for the descriptive analysis of the interviews 
that followed (Patton, 2002) (see Appendix III for a sample of the initial coding scheme). The 
transcripts (minus the code analysis) were then sent to the interviewees via email for review and 
approval. Specific areas of clarification or expansion for interviewee attention were highlighted and in 
many cases some post-interview questions that may have arisen following the interviews or during the 
reading of the transcripts were prepared. In certain cases, interviewees went to great effort to edit and 
expand upon their individual interview transcript, with some EPFI interviewees engaging in telephone 
conversations to address follow-up questions. These conversations were also recorded and transcribed.  
 
Observational data 
Observations based on the first author’s experiences while working at UNEP-FI and those 
arising from the documentary analysis were enrolled to supplement the interview data analysis. For 
example, the UNEP-FI observations provided key insights into the 'psyche' of banks and NGOs; their 
perceptions of each other; how they interacted; their differences of opinion on key issues related to 
sustainable finance; the tensions these differences caused; their growing mutual awareness and respect 
for each other despite the on-going tensions; and the roles they played in public group forums while 
developing one-on-one relationships behind the scenes regarding bank policy development and other 
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issues related to sustainable finance. These observations augmented the specific insights gained during 
the in-depth interviews and were supplemented with further observations made at a number of 
conferences where sustainable finance and/or the Equator Principles were discussed by both bank and 
NGO representatives. 
 
Construction of case narrative  
The final interview transcripts were used in the further identification, or confirmation, of the 
key themes emerging in the interviews (see Appendix III). Such respondent validation enhanced the 
credibility of the interview data and the dependability of the research process (Huberman & Miles, 
1994; Patton, 2002). For this paper, these themes were re-interpreted and framed drawing on the 
principal concepts of: field structuration processes; internal and external (social) movements; and 
issue-based fields. Our key focus was to ground these concepts in our empirical analysis in order to 
investigate, understand and explain the complexity of the data embedded in the key themes 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007). A number of revised, interrelated overarching themes emerged  
from this re-interpretation, and included, inter alia, NGO visions of socially accountable (‘just’) 
finance; a shared NGO meaning system – underpinned by a community-oriented environmental and 
social logic; theorizing risk management; assimilating competing logics; reconstructing rationales and 
logics; incentivising incremental change; mobilising collective action and cultural resources; internal 
and external (social) movement consultation and contestation (over social accountability); pooling 
resources and mobilising an issue-based community; reflexivity among internal and external (social) 
movements; cooperation among competitors; governing an internal (social) movement; actor issue-
identification; and capturing issue ambiguity
8
. The overall analysis involved an iterative and reflexive 
interaction between the above themes  and the principal  concepts in order to inductively derive a case 
analysis focused on: (1) the NGO activities that helped initiate the EP and influenced the subsequent 
EP issue-based field structuration process; (2) how and why the EP and the EP issue-based field 
structuration process evolved; and (3) the effects of this process on how the EPFIs addressed their 
social accountability. This analysis was subjected to further scrutiny and enrichment drawing on the 
broader documentary evidence analysis and observational data.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 We would like to explicitly recognise the extensive assistance of the two reviewers in assisting with the focus 
of our interpretation. 
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CASE CONTEXTUALISATION: PROJECT FINANCE AND THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 
Project finance has traditionally represented the most visible and tangible environmental and 
social impact of the finance sector due to its association with the financing of large, complex 
environmentally and socially sensitive projects involving the installation of dams, power plants, 
mines, and oil and gas pipelines in developing world and emerging economies. The lender normally 
relies on the revenues generated by a single project for repayment of and security for the finance 
provided. For example, in the case of the funding of a power plant, the lender is usually paid solely or 
almost exclusively out of the money generated by the contracts for the facility’s output, such as the 
electricity sold by the plant. The borrower is usually an SPE (Special Purpose Entity) that is not 
permitted to perform any function other than developing, owning, and operating the funded 
installation. Repayment therefore depends primarily on the project’s cash flows and on the collateral 
value of the project’s assets (Equator Principles II, 2006). 
Project finance deals are financed by both debt and equity. Depending on the project, more 
than one type of debt provider may be involved. This can include a bank syndicate, multilateral 
agencies (e.g. The World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and regional development 
banks), bilateral agencies (development agencies and export-import financing agencies) and/or Export 
Credit Agencies (ECAs). Equity for projects is normally provided by the project sponsor(s) and may 
be supplemented by equity raised in national and international capital markets (Esty & Sesia, 2005; 
Hoffman, 2008).  
Syndication is a typical financing structure for project finance as it spreads out the potential 
risks associated with a project. An average project finance deal may have 10 to 15 banks involved in 
the syndicate, including the “lead arranger”. The lead arranger agrees with the client to underwrite the 
loan and to sell the remaining amount to other financial institutions. This creates a syndication of 
banks that purchase the loan and thus provide debt financing for the project. “Second tier banks”, for 
example, smaller project financiers or emerging market banks, normally make up the majority of this 
syndicate of lenders.  
The Equator Principles were designed as a set of voluntary environmental and social risk 
management guidelines for project finance. Based on the then International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
safeguard policies, financial institutions (FIs) were requested to apply the Principles in their execution 
and management of project finance deals of (originally) $50 million dollars and upwards. When 
financing (and later also advising on) a project, adopting financial institutions were specifically asked 
to: review and categorise projects as either “A” (high risk), “B” (moderate risk) or “C” (low risk) as 
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per IFC classifications; ensure an environmental (and later social) assessment and management plan 
for the project was developed; ensure adequate community consultation was conducted; covenant the 
borrower to meet Equator Principles’ requirements; employ independent experts to monitor borrower 
compliance; and work with borrowers to address any breaches of compliance. By adopting the Equator 
Principles, financial institutions voluntarily committed to apply environmental and social principles to 
the design, execution and management of project finance loans and pledged not to engage with or 
provide finance to clients who would not comply with the Principles
9
.  
 
CASE FINDINGS 
Holding Project Finance to account: The emergence of an external NGO movement  
 Throughout the 1990s, there was widespread privatisation of large-scale public infrastructure 
projects (e.g. power plants, roads, ports and telecommunications) in developing countries. Combined 
with the withdrawal of World Bank lending, this led to a dramatic increase in (Western) commercial 
bank financing for these projects (Wright, 2009) which were rife with adverse environmental and 
social impacts. A number of international NGOs became concerned that this increased private sector 
financing meant that “private banks [were] able to operate in relative anonymity” (Rainforest Action 
Network (RAN) interviewee
10
), and were unconcerned about and unaccountable for the large scale 
environmental and social impacts of the projects they financed. These NGOs wanted environmental 
and social impacts integrated into and prioritised within commercial bank lending and investment 
decisions. Drawing on their extensive knowledge base, they commenced holding these banks to 
account for the environmental and social impacts of their lending activities using direct advocacy 
campaigning and strategic shareholder activism (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009; Waygood, 2006). 
 
Many of the early campaigns were led by individual NGOs operating alone. These included 
Friends of the Earth (FOE) US’s 1995 campaign against Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley regarding 
their financial links with the Three Gorges Dam (Ethical Corporation, 2006), and FoE Netherlands’ 
1997 campaign against ABN Amro’s financing of the Freeport McMoRan/Rio Tinto gold and copper 
mining project in West Papua, Indonesia (Steen, 2008). One of the most successful campaigns was 
The Rainforest Action Network’s (RAN) sustained four-year attack on Citigroup which began in 2000. 
                                                          
9
 The EP have been subject to two revisions since their inception. The most recent revision process occurred 
between 2011 and 2013 and culminated in the launch of what was called EP III in June 2013. 
10
 Please see Table 1 for details of the NGO interviewees. 
15 
 
 
 
 
RAN was highly critical of Citigroup’s funding for destructive fossil-based projects (RAN, 2005; 
Wright, 2009) and launched customer boycotts against Citigroup in the US. Between 2000 and 2001, 
FoE Netherlands and Greenpeace Netherlands also led a highly visible campaign against Dutch banks 
involved in palm oil plantations in Indonesia. The campaign led to significant media coverage and a 
letter writing/post card campaign attacking these banks, which many NGOs believe influenced ABN 
Amro and four other Dutch Banks (FMO, Fortis, ING and Rabobank) to develop forestry policies for 
clients active in these sectors (FoE Netherlands/Europe interviewee).  
 
          In 2002, in an effort to coordinate this escalating, but somewhat disparate campaigning, a 
global coalition of NGOs – including CRBM, FoE Netherlands, FoE US, The Berne Declaration, RAN 
and WWF-UK – pooled their political and cultural resources and congregated in order to develop a 
collective set of formal demands for the financial sector known as “The Collevecchio Declaration”. 
Launched in January 2003, the Declaration outlined various commitments for the incorporation and 
prioritisation of environmental and social concerns into all financial operations, including 
commitments to sustainability, responsibility, accountability and transparency. The proposed policies 
and procedures were aimed at significantly broadening financial institutions’ (FIs’) risk management 
practices to ensure enhanced consideration of environmental and social issues (BankTrack, 2004b). 
The Declaration called upon FIs to take immediate steps to implement the commitments in order to 
ensure that they retained their “social licence to operate”; a licence the NGOs claimed was under 
threat as ‘civil society’ was increasingly questioning FIs’ social accountability. Essentially, the 
Declaration explicitly framed what the NGO collective believed socially accountable finance should 
represent. This collective vision was underpinned by the adoption of agenda-setting rhetoric 
mobilising the notion of ‘just finance’, the rationale for which was underpinned by a community-
oriented environmental and social logic: 
 
I think there was the need for us [NGOs] at the time … to get out ahead of the banks in terms 
of what our vision of ‘just finance’ was, so that we could then begin to cross the road there. 
You know there’s always a risk in plotting the road by walking it because then we’re adhering 
our own vision to what the banks think is possible. And actually, I think the Collevecchio 
Declaration [was] instrumental in setting the goalposts. (Rainforest Action Network (RAN) 
interviewee) 
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Theorizing and mobilising resources and action: The advent of the internal Equator Principles 
Financial Institution (EPFI) movement 
 
The sustained intensity of NGO campaigning, now formally framed within the demands of the 
Collevecchio Declaration, was widely viewed as having tarnished the reputations of targeted financial 
institutions (FIs) while increasing the risk of litigation against them due to some campaigns’ exposure 
of environmental and social misconduct by FI project finance clients. The perceived risk of retail 
customer boycotts and the emergence of new forms of shareholder activism caused some commercial 
bank executives to believe they needed to respond to these criticisms in a coordinated fashion (Wright 
& Rwabizambuga, 2006).   
Hence, in October 2002, ABN Amro and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) convened 
a meeting in London (Wright 2006) with Barclays, Citigroup and WestLB to begin discussions on a 
common approach to perceived challenges to their risk management frameworks. There was significant 
concern that banks were “not doing enough due diligence and truly understanding the risks” (Dutch 
EPFI 1, Interviewee 1
11
) associated with their project finance deals. Each bank at the meeting had been 
the target of extensive NGO campaigning, and all later acknowledged, in various public domains (and 
within our research interviews), the significant influence the NGO campaigns had on their increased 
scrutiny of existing approaches to project finance.  
 
The subsequent initiation of the Equator Principles was thus based upon discussions between 
elite actors within these four banks, in association with the IFC. They theorized the adverse 
environmental and social impacts of project finance as a problem of risk management that could be 
resolved by adopting a set of agreed lending principles based on risk management concerns. The 
underlying market logic driving project finance risk management procedures underpinned these 
legitimating accounts and represented the beginning of an effort to reconstruct the project finance 
rationale by assimilating the NGOs’ community-oriented environmental and social logic within the 
prevailing market-oriented risk management logic underpinning project finance (Thornton et al., 2012; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Schneiberg & Lounsbury 2008). The market logic was perceived as 
resonating best with the values and interests of other project finance field participants which could 
assist in mobilising collective action and resources for the development of the EP.  The global stature 
of the four leading institutions and their central role within the project finance field added credibility 
to their efforts and acted as resources that assisted them in convincing six additional commercial banks 
                                                          
11
 Please see Table 2 for details of the Equators Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) interviewees. 
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to support the EP launch. Among these additional six banks there was a strong sense that this was a 
development that was potentially ground breaking and required their involvement: 
 
 [We thought] if the big boys are in there, the big global banks [who are] the big market leaders 
in project finance, then obviously this is serious … This [i]s going to be big … [and that] … it 
was [potentially] ground breaking work in terms of incorporating E, S and G [environment, 
social and governance]… into the banking sector. (Australian EPFI).  
 
The initial group of four banks were keen to mobilize a critical mass of leading project finance 
institutions to finalise and launch the EP in order to ensure the credibility of the initiative, reduce the 
potential market risks associated with it, and to position the EP as an industry standard thereby 
coercing non-EP compliant banks into adopting the Principles. The nature of the existing project 
finance syndication market was seen as significantly assisting with this aim: 
 
We wanted critical mass. I mean I was Global Head of Project Finance at the time, so you 
know, we were concerned about the competitive element as well […] and we felt that if you 
could get the right banks involved, because of the nature of the syndication market for these 
deals, it would help to position Equator as an industry standard […] It would mean that every 
deal that they [non-EP compliant banks] did with an Equator bank leading it would be Equator 
compliant. It would make it more difficult for them [non EP compliant banks] to actually 
arrange and structure a transaction unless they made it Equator compliant. (Dutch EPFI 1, 
Interviewee 2)  
 
Moreover, many felt that a standardised framework for assessing environmental and social  
risks in project finance would greatly improve what they saw as the ad-hoc application of existing 
World Bank environmental guidelines to project finance deals, and would also assist in “levelling […] 
the playing field” (UK EPFI 1, interviewee 1) with respect to environmental and social issues in the 
project finance market. This would present a more coherent, collective response to the concerns of 
campaigning NGOs and replace the prevailing “case specific, ad-hoc defence against NGO criticism” 
(Dutch EPFI 1, Interviewee 1).  
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Theorizing and crafting the Equator Principles: Advancing a rationale for incremental change 
in project finance 
The initial ten banks (we term these the ‘EP leaders’12) agreed that the EP should be structured 
to apply only to project finance activities. They rationalised this not only because these activities were 
the main focus of NGO campaigning, but also because the size and structured nature of project finance 
deals made it easier for financial institutions (FIs) to identify the environmental and social  risks 
associated with particular projects. This allowed them to adjust their credit risk assessment procedures 
and loan documentation accordingly. In project finance, the use of proceeds is known and the projects’ 
expected revenue streams are regarded as remuneration for the loan. Hence, any potential 
environmental and social risks that could hamper the successful construction and operation of a 
project, and thus potentially place the client in default of the loan, ought to be taken into consideration 
at commencement. In short, project finance was “the one product where banks ha[d] the unique 
combination of exposure to risk and ability to influence” (Dutch EPFI 1, Interviewee 1). Project 
finance therefore made environmental and social  issues more ‘tangible’ and manageable than, for 
example, standard commercial loans where the use of proceeds was not always known and where FIs 
had less leverage to call in a loan on environmental and social grounds alone. Consistent with their 
vision of incremental change, in drafting the Principles the banks drew on existing resources within 
the mature project finance field including: international environmental and social  policies and 
guidelines; their own knowledge of environmental issues;  and one of the bank’s mining policies.   
 
In general, the EP leaders were aware of the extensive policy and procedural implications that 
the EP could have within their own organizations and wanted to ensure that the EP could be 
streamlined with their existing operations. It was therefore essential that the Principles were framed as 
being easily integrated within traditional decision-making processes in the project finance banks: 
When banks adopt or develop policy it literally becomes law, and it’s codified into the way in 
which that bank does business. So, banks do not take lightly the development of policy on 
anything. Trust me, [our] oil and gas policy took a year and a half to develop and probably 
about three months of approval through four different committees […] And in drafting the 
Equator Principles, that was what all the banks were looking at, they were saying this is going 
to go into my investment guidelines, this is going to go into my credit guidelines, this is going 
to change the way in which I look at projects.  I need to find ways in which this is built into 
whatever structures. (Dutch EPFI 1, Interviewee 1)  
                                                          
12 Throughout the case narrative ‘EP leaders’ is the term we use to refer collectively to the four commercial banks that 
initiated the development of the EP and the six banks that later joined them to launch the EP on June 4th, 2003. These ten 
banks are distinguished from those banks that adopted the EP after they were launched. This latter group are divided into: (1) 
EP “early adopters” i.e. those banks that adopted the EP between June and October 2003; and (2) EP “late adopters” i.e. those 
banks that adopted the EP between November 2005 and September 2007. The ‘EP leaders’, ‘early adopters’, and ‘late 
adopters’ are collectively referred to as the ‘Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) movement’.  
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Furthermore, in order to encourage wider acceptance within the project finance field, a loosely 
specified, discretionary approach to the structure of the EP was adopted especially regarding 
accountability requirements related to external reporting on compliance with the Principles: 
 
The reason [the EP] moved so quickly was because it was a loose association, it was very informal and 
it was voluntary. If we’d been looking at building something that was a rigid […] structure with formal 
governance, legal obligations and some sort of accreditation […] we’d still have been debating it I’m 
sure. It [would] never have been launched. And also, more banks would have been cautious about 
adopting it. (UK EPFI 1, Interviewee 1) 
 
This overarching risk management rationale, combined with the EP leaders’ powerful political 
positions in the mature project finance field, assisted in diffusing the EP following their launch on June 
4
th, 2003. The ‘early adopters’ in our study – financial institutions who adopted the EP between June 
and October 2003 - perceived the EP as a serious initiative that went beyond public relations and 
competitive positioning due to the legitimacy they attached to the financial institutions initially 
involved. Moreover, these early adopters highlighted the importance of being part of an evolving 
movement towards EP-conditioned loans in the project finance market and the practical benefits of a 
standardised approach to managing environmental and social risks throughout the field. 
 
Rival movement consultation and contestation 
By late 2003, early 2004, a small but growing field focused around the EP was emerging. This 
was initially populated by the nascent Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) and NGO 
movements, and, to a lesser extent, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Subsequently, 
heightened levels of interaction, mutual awareness, and an increase in the information load 
surrounding the EP materialised both between and among these bodies. For example, given 
widespread claims that the EP were starting to alter the face of the project finance market, the EPFI 
movement started holding meetings to share their initial experiences with EP implementation; discuss 
the impact of the EP on risk management frameworks; and outline IFC training on EP implementation 
(EP Website Announcement, 2004a). These meetings sought to enhance the visibility of emerging 
organizational practices in order to assist EP diffusion among non-EP adopting banks. 
 
In January 2004, the campaigning NGOs organized themselves into a more formal movement 
named BankTrack. Their aim was to establish a more coherent network capable of exerting greater 
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influence on the activities of the private financial sector. BankTrack immediately entered into a formal 
dialogue with the EPFI movement, particularly around the lack of accountability mechanisms 
embedded in the EP structure and across EP banks. Field formation around the EP escalated over the 
following two years as EP adopters increased and environmental and social consultants and lawyers 
focused on the EP emerged to advise the increasing number of EP adopters: 
 
Once the Equator Principles were launched, then more dialogue started, the institutions talked to each 
other, we learned through each other.  There was a huge amount of sharing of information: ‘this is what 
we’re doing, what are you doing?’ Meetings with the NGOs; two-day meetings talking about reporting 
and transparency […] we’d obviously got BankTrack [there] with all their own aspirations. And you 
know, we’d sit down and we had good honest debates with the NGOs.  So yeah, the Equator Principles 
themselves evolved in that initial period, that 12 to 18 month period after they were launched. 
(Australian EPFI) 
 
 
 The interaction between the EPFIs and BankTrack was often confrontational, particularly as 
BankTrack continued to contest the lack of EPFI accountability at field and organizational levels in a 
series of highly publicised documents (BankTrack, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b). While 
the NGO movement openly acknowledged that the development of the EP was the “first time there had 
been … a substantive industry response to the sustainability agenda … laid out by … NGOs” (Friends 
of the Earth (FoE), US), they continually contested the discretionary nature of EP adoption, 
implementation, and compliance. 
 
For the NGOs, these perceived deficiencies raised serious questions about the EPFIs’ 
substantive commitment to their environmental and social responsibilities, particularly as the 
Collevecchio Declaration had specified the need for banks to address all of their financial operations 
and not just project finance; which represented less than 5 per cent of commercial bank activities. 
Moreover, despite the fact that some EPFI leaders were beginning to report on EP implementation, the 
perceived slow pace and inconsistency of implementation, transparency and disclosure across different 
EPFIs, as well as evidence of the continued financing of questionable projects by certain EPFIs
 
enraged BankTrack. This was exacerbated by the continuing absence of field-level governance 
mechanisms to hold the increasing number of EPFI adopters to account. While BankTrack met with 
the EPFIs and relayed these concerns, the EPFIs refused outright to establish the ‘multi-transparent 
accountability mechanisms’ that BankTrack requested: 
 
After a year and a half we came to them and said “it’s not working, we have some banks that have gone 
beyond project finance or whatever…and we have other banks that aren’t even internalising whatever 
procedures [are necessary] for implementation or keep financing rubbish, so what the hell is going on?” 
So, if you want to protect the bottom line, to be coherent, you need to put up a sort of multi-transparent 
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accountability mechanism. And they said “no, forget it” … And I still see that this is the dividing 
argument between us and them. I mean beyond whatever policies that you adopt, the fundamental issue 
is …how you are being held accountable in achieving this by those that are affected by your operations? 
(Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale (CRBM) interviewee). 
 
 
Many EPFI interviewees claimed that the EPFIs’ tentative approach to accountability was 
influenced by the mature commercial bank project finance field’s entrenchment in a culture of secrecy, 
commercial confidentiality, and legal restrictions. Given these characteristics, these interviewees 
claimed that the EP actually represented a significant departure for the banks involved given that many 
of them had, at this time, developed no sustainability mandates, established no separate sustainability 
divisions, and had never produced sustainability reports. Moreover, despite the absence of 
accountability criteria in the original principles, several EP leader interviewees’ claimed that there 
existed a “gentleman’s agreement” (Dutch EPFI 1, Interviewee 1) within their collective to take EP 
implementation and compliance disclosures seriously. They had agreed that due to the voluntary 
nature of the Principles, each individual bank should be responsible for its own EP implementation 
and disclosure and was to be “judged [on its] own individual performance” (UK EPFI 1, Interviewee 
1). There was a collective view that no bank had the right to “tell another bank how to run their 
business” (UK EPFI 1, Interviewee 1) and, as each bank was structured differently, a “one size fits all” 
approach to implementation and accountability was unworkable.  
 
Nevertheless, the EPFIs were not entirely immune to the NGOs’ concerns and gradually 
began to acknowledge some of the emerging challenges associated with the diffusion and governance 
of the EP. For example, throughout 2004 and 2005, a ‘floating’ EP secretariat was established and run 
by one EPFI via the fledgling EP website. Annual meetings with NGOs and small EPFI-NGO 
working groups on issues such as disclosure were formed and a rotating EPFI Chair position was 
established. Hence, a level of reflexivity was evident amongst active EPFIs regarding the manner in 
which the EP, the EP issue-based field and the EPFI movement were evolving. Nonetheless, despite 
persistent NGO criticism, the EPFIs exercised their hierarchical position in the issue-based field and 
continued to reject the NGO movements’ requests for more stringent accountability and governance of 
the EP and EPFI movement. This resistance to enhanced accountability dominated interactions 
between EPFIs and NGOs, and directly influenced the ongoing structuration of the issue-based field 
throughout 2004 and 2005.  
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
The persistence of competing accountability rationales  
In February 2006, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) revised its Safeguard Policies 
(upon which the EP were based) and introduced environmental and social performance standards. In 
response, the EPFIs organized a three-month consultation process involving NGOs, project finance 
clients and some official agencies aimed at drafting a revised set of Principles (EP Website 
Announcement, 2006). These consultations reflected an increasing level of interaction between 
participants in the issue-based field as well as a slowly emerging recognition within BankTrack and 
the EPFI movement of the mutual benefits of more constructive dialogue. Following the consultation 
process, on July 6
th
, 2006, the Equator Principles II (EP II) were launched.
 
One of the key new criteria 
involved the establishment of a reporting Principle, “Principle 10” requesting each adopting EPFI to 
commit “to report publicly at least annually about its Equator Principles implementation processes and 
experience, taking into account appropriate confidentiality considerations” (EP II, 2006, p.5, emphasis 
added). This was accompanied by a footnote, which stipulated that:  
Such reporting should at a minimum include the number of transactions screened by each EPFI, 
including the categorization accorded to transactions (and may include a breakdown by sector 
or region), and information regarding implementation. (Equator Principles II (EP II), 2006, p.5) 
 
Even though the NGOs generally welcomed improvements to the structure of EP II, BankTrack 
found Principle 10 vague in its requirements, and complained that no practical guidance was provided 
on how it should be implemented. This was deemed a “lowest common denominator” approach to 
EPFI social accountability and an insufficient response to the extensive transparency and disclosure 
recommendations that BankTrack had repeatedly framed in detailed texts (see e.g., BankTrack, 2006a, 
2006b). The BankTrack coordinator interviewed claimed that, had it not been for the NGO 
recommendations the reporting footnote would never have existed. The EPFIs, however, again 
influenced by the professional boundaries of the mature project finance field, asserted that the 
inclusion of the reporting principle was another important, incremental step in the progression of the 
EP. A minimum standard for reporting was perceived as the most practical option given the 
persistence of disclosure-related challenges surrounding commercial confidentiality – particularly 
regarding the disclosure of internal risk management procedures to competing banks. 
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The intensification of issue-based field structuration - Influencing the mature project finance 
field 
 During the revision process, the three ‘late adopter’ interviewees – representing banks that 
adopted the EP between November 2005 and September 2007 - actively considered the significance of 
the revised EP implementation and reporting requirements for their organizations. The evolving issue-
based field began to significantly influence the mature commercial bank project finance field when by 
late 2005 EPFIs were widely quoted as arranging over 70% of project finance deals. These market 
trends meant it was becoming increasingly difficult for any bank to enter into project finance 
syndication without being an EP adopter:  
Basically, the idea in the end was that we had all the structures, all the tools to be in line with 
the Equator Principles, so why not adopt them?  And on the other hand there were some, of 
course, broader connections [between] the top management and IFC, and with other banks, 
[who were] saying ‘you should join now because it could be very good for you and the 
Equator Principles’, because [Name of interviewee organization] is such a big institution for 
project finance […] I think what was also an incentive to join was that when we asked the 
business line what they thought about it they said ‘well, we already asked to [adopt it] actually 
because the market is asking for it’. Nowadays, when you are either an advisor or the arranger 
for project finance you have to think about the Principles if you want to syndicate the loan. 
(French EPFI, Interviewee 1)  
 
 
The arrival of these late adopters signified the Equator Principles’ growing stature as the 
recognised standard or norm for socially accountable project finance. They both experienced and 
contributed to the emerging movement towards EP adoption in the project finance field as well as 
having the advantage of being able to learn from and benchmark themselves against the perceived 
“best practice” of existing EPFIs. Interviewees noted how the issue-based field – particularly the 
support of the EPFI movement and the growing body of EP consultants – was, at this stage, facilitating 
even greater information exchange and capacity building around EP implementation. One interviewee 
highlighted the extensive “body of knowledge and body of practice” that he could draw on, which, he 
claimed, was aided by the “collegial relationship between the various Equator [EP] banks” thereby 
allowing him to “call on others in other banks to get advice” when needed (Dutch/Belgian EPFI, 
Interviewee 2). 
 
The support for EP implementation within financial institutions increased further when, 
following an EPFI meeting in Washington in May 2007, a brief guidance document for reporting on 
EP implementation was produced. This proposed minimum requirements for reporting, suggestions on 
the extent of information disclosures, and formats for data presentation (EP, 2007). In addition, 
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working groups focused on discussing EP loan documentation processes, governance issues, and NGO 
engagement were either newly formed or became more formalised thereby further increasing the level 
of collective EPFI action on EP diffusion. 
 
Evolving issue-based field contestation and structuration  
Despite some EP adopters’ individual efforts to implement the EP over the 2004 to 2007 
period, active EPFIs concluded that certain EPFIs [termed ‘free riders’ by BankTrack] were 
“exploit[ing] the Equator Principles as some sort of environmental PR [public relations] mechanism” 
(UK EPFI 1, Interviewee 1). These included EPFIs who claimed to have adopted the EP but had no 
project finance operations, were not involved in various EP issue-based field activities, and/or 
continued to finance highly questionable transactions. Hence, as the total number of EPFIs had risen to 
forty by 2007, the small number of 10 to 15 active EPFIs considered reconstituting the EP 
requirements in order to better manage the relationship between the EPFI movement “vanguard and 
tail” (UK EPFI 1, Interviewee 1). A working group on EPFI governance at field and organizational 
level was developed where EPFIs decided that external reporting on EP compliance should become 
the required EP membership condition.  
 
These requirements were developed against the background of a BankTrack public assessment 
of EPFI reporting which showed that of the EPFIs that had adopted the EP before 2007 “40 per cent 
did not meet the[se] minimum [reporting] requirements, [while] 19 per cent met them, and 40 per cent 
exceeded them” (BankTrack, 2007a, p.1).  Hence, while the NGOs welcomed the EPFI movement’s 
efforts to finally address some aspects of EP accountability and governance, they were again 
dismissive of the new reporting proposal, insisting that it represented “a very minimal change” 
(BankTrack Coordinator). It was perceived as a wholly inadequate way of addressing the EP ‘free-
rider’ problem, especially as the reporting requirements were not stringent and, according to the 
BankTrack Coordinator, “just basically put in writing what ABN Amro and a few other banks [we]re 
doing already”. In general, the NGOs wanted much more information disclosed on banks’ clients, 
individual projects, and so-called “rosy deals” i.e. deals where the EP had been effectively applied (to 
match the list of EPFI “dodgy deals” posted on the BankTrack website).  
 
The EPFIs, however, insisted, that, in the absence of more formal accountability mechanisms 
“the [ultimate] sanction [was] the bank’s reputation” (US EPFI). Moreover, they diverted their 
attention towards developing a new EP management structure which came into operation in early 2008 
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and marked a significant departure in the governance of the EP. This structure established a steering 
committee comprising many of the original “group of ten” EPFIs and a set of seven working groups. 
An EPFI Chair was formed to oversee the steering committee, working groups and engagement with 
the IFC, and a more formal secretariat function was established to deal with EP administration. These 
developments further enhanced the sophistication of the emerging issue-based field infrastructure. 
 
A progression in EPFI social accountability: The EP ‘institution’ in 2008 
By the fifth anniversary of the EP in June 2008, there were sixty adopting EPFIs and the 
Principles were widely recognised as the “gold standard for sustainable project finance … [that 
had] … transformed the funding of major projects globally” (EP Press Release, 2008a). For example, 
it was estimated that in 2007, 71 per cent of the total debt tracked in emerging markets was subject to 
the EP (EP Press Release, 2008a). The EP had evolved into the project finance “institution”, 
influencing the lending practices of active EPFIs in the mature commercial bank project finance field. 
The Principles were embedded into: the due diligence carried out on a project (involving Principles 1, 
2 and 3); credit risk approval processes (Principles 4, 5 and 6); the initial term sheet and loan 
documentation (Principle 8); and the loan documentation over the life of a loan (Principles 5 to 9 
inclusive). They also increased the EPFIs’ need to demonstrate some level of social accountability 
(Principle 10). For example, one EPFI interviewee claimed that:  
They [EP] are making differences in which decisions [are made] […] [Name of interviewee 
organization] turn down transactions for non-Equator compliance. I know other banks that 
have done the same thing.  The Equator Principles allow banks to get into discussions with 
clients to try and change things. (Dutch EPFI 1, Interviewee 1)   
 
Several EPFI interviewees indicated that the EP had created a much needed standardised 
framework for environmental and social risk management for project financiers; where the EP had 
created a “community” of broad stakeholders, and facilitated the common recognition and 
communication of environmental and social issues within project finance practice. This highlighted 
the increasingly structured nature of the issue-based field:  
[There are] benefits to the bank and benefits to the client, and Equator is now just part of the 
terminology, it is part of the lexicon surrounding project finance. The biggest success to me is 
not about the 54 banks that have adopted it, it’s actually the fact that lawyers talk about the 
Equator Principles and environmental consultants talk about the Equator Principles, and the 
banks. And now it’s […] created a community and it’s made it more efficient in terms of 
communication. As soon as you say ‘Equator’ you should know what environmental 
management standards we’re talking about. (UK EPFI 1, Interviewee 1) 
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A maturing of the relationship between the NGO and EPFI movements also emerged 
throughout the field. While their relationship had long been strained given their competing rationales 
for socially accountable project finance, their mutual tolerance, respect and understanding of each 
other had improved by 2008. Interviewees from both NGOs and the EPFIs indicated that while 
significant, and often irresolvable, differences remained and contestation continued, they now 
recognised more opportunities for cooperation around the EP and broader environmental and social 
policies and activities: 
I think most of them [active EPFI representatives] want the Equator Principles to be properly 
applied. But the dilemmas of the individual project officer, who’s struggling with [EP] 
requirements on the one hand, and the need to sign the deal on the other, is a difficulty […] 
[So] it was very much the effort of the banks to make us more aware of their everyday 
problems, and I always like to hear that, as it refines your thinking. (BankTrack) 
With respect to EPFIs’ environmental and social reporting, despite the NGOs’ continuing 
concerns, the level and quality of EPFI transparency and disclosure regarding EP implementation 
increased significantly between 2003 and 2008. By 2008, the majority of EPFIs were meeting the 
basic EP reporting requirements of Principle 10 – the EPFI “membership” condition. Many EPFIs, and 
certainly those interviewed for this research, went well beyond the basic minimum reporting 
requirements to include varying levels of information on key aspects of their EP implementation 
procedures. They also published case studies on “dilemmas” regarding challenging or high profile 
projects and the stakeholder engagements associated with these. EP leader organizations were at the 
forefront of this EP-related disclosure thereby reflecting a trend towards greater, albeit selective, 
exposure of internal environmental and social policies and risk management approaches.  
 
DISCUSSION  
The case narrative reveals how the NGO and Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) 
movements shaped Equator Principles issue-based field structuration through their (re)construction of 
competing rationales and mobilization of collective action and political and cultural resources around 
their opposing notions of socially accountable project finance. This structuration process was 
predominantly controlled by the incumbent EPFI movement and was iteratively and recursively linked 
to the existing infrastructure (cultural, relational and operational systems) of the mature project 
finance field.  
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The analysis unveils how, initially, individual and later collective NGO campaigns drew 
public attention to the adverse environmental and social implications of finance sector lending 
activities. Throughout these campaigns NGOs constructed a shared meaning system around ‘socially 
accountable finance’, the rationale for which was underpinned by a community-oriented 
environmental and social logic. The NGOs’ collective approach strengthened their salience and their 
potential influence on the finance sector (King, 2008). In particular, it created uncertainty in the parts 
of the commercial bank community engaged in project finance causing key individuals in 
organizations that had been targeted by NGO campaigning to question the adequacy of their existing 
risk management frameworks. These incumbents theorized the need for change and sought to 
reconstruct the existing rationale for project finance by assimilating the NGOs’ community-oriented 
environmental and social logic within the prevailing market-oriented risk management logic 
underpinning project finance (Thornton et al., 2012). To do so, they enrolled their existing knowledge 
and experience with environmental risk management to produce a draft set of environmental and 
social principles for project finance, and used their central, elite positions in the project finance field 
to mobilize the additional political support necessary to create the Equator Principles.  
 
While the external NGO movement influenced the initiation of the Equator Principles 
Financial Institution (EPFI) movement within the project finance field (see also, Davis et al., 2008; 
Fligstein, 1996), it was ultimately unable to mobilize sufficient resources to ensure that its vision of 
‘just finance’ prevailed. In particular, the absence of stringent EP accountability mechanisms 
undermined its vision of socially accountable finance. The EPFIs, given their embeddedness in the 
mature project finance field, saw their priority as developing a set of ‘aspirational’ environmental and 
social risk management guidelines which would not threaten, and could even enhance, their 
competitive advantage. These opposing NGO and EPFI movement visions of what the EP could and 
should be led to on-going interpretive struggles around the notion of socially accountable project 
finance and proved central to initiating the structuration of the EP issue-based field.  
 
The EP leaders’ theorisation of the EP into understandable and compelling formats through, 
for example, their justification of new EP norms and practices on pragmatic economic grounds acted 
as an important EP diffusion mechanism among early adopters (Zilber, 2006). The Equator Principles 
Financial Institution (EPFI) movement gradually emerged as a political-cultural force for EP diffusion. 
It drew on the existing meaning systems and professional networks and channels of the extant project 
finance field. For example, it embedded discussions of the EP into the overarching risk management 
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rationale of the mature project finance field and ensured that the EP could be seamlessly embedded 
within existing credit risk analysis processes.  
Persistent contestation between the NGO and EPFI movements regarding the interpretation of 
socially accountable project finance was, however, a key characteristic of the field structuration 
process. Banktrack’s social accountability demands were unrelenting and eventually led to the EPFIs 
considering the necessity of EP external reporting, and of engaging more directly with BankTrack. 
BankTrack was, however, not powerful enough to persuade the Equator Principles Financial 
Institutions (EPFIs) to embrace highly stringent field-level accountability mechanisms in the revised 
EP (EP II). However, as this NGO-EPFI contestation continued, the diffusion of the EP and the 
simultaneous structuration of the EP issue-based field continued apace. The normative movement 
toward EP adoption in the project finance market became a key catalyst for EP adoption by late 
adopters, in particular the nature of the project finance syndication market in which ordinarily 
competing banks cooperated. Given the nature of this market, if financial institutions failed to adopt 
the EP, the issue-based field formation would have continued to crystallise without them thereby 
excluding them from project finance deals. Moreover, late adopters were able to utilise the 
increasingly structured EPFI movements’ information exchange and capacity-building channels at the 
issue-based field level to assist their EP implementation efforts. 
 
Growth in EP adopters did, however, bring its own problems, particularly in a context where 
efforts were being made to get competitors to align around an agreed interpretation of EP 
implementation. For the EP leaders, the initial mobilization of the collective around the EP was 
accompanied by the challenge of maintaining, co-ordinating and governing this collective (see also, 
Dorado, 2005). Consequently, EPFI leaders developed, inter alia, an EP governance working group 
and agreed that EPFI reporting would become the EP membership requirement from 2007 onwards, in 
particular to address a persistent EP ‘free-rider’ problem. By 2008, the EP issue-based field 
infrastructure had become increasingly sophisticated and the EP were considered as the standard 
(institution) for socially accountable project finance.  
 
While BankTrack remained highly critical of the EPFI movement’s market-oriented rationale 
and their limited action regarding EPFI accountability, the mutual awareness and respect between the 
EPFI and NGO movements matured as the EP issue-based field evolved. However, this occurred in a 
context where normative contestation over the nature of socially accountable project finance persisted. 
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Theorizing issue-based field structuration  
The case analysis extends our understanding of Hoffman’s (1999) conceptualisation of how 
issues, in particular sustainability-related issues, affect mature fields. Drawing on this analysis, we 
now propose a model which theorizes how issue-based fields evolve an institutional infrastructure (see 
Figure 1). Central to our model is that issue-based fields evolve an institutional infrastructure - 
common meaning, relational and operational systems - based primarily upon the infrastructure of the 
existing mature field which they straddle. In our case, common meaning systems comprise, inter alia: 
the rationale/logics underpinning the EP; EPFI knowledge exchange about EP experiences amongst 
EPFIs; and rationale/logics and sense-making about EP revisions amid EPFIs. The common relational 
systems include: the EPFI informal and formal network amongst EPFIs; EPFI (group and individual) 
formal and informal networks with clients; NGOs (the Banktrack collective and the individual NGOs 
within it); and EP ‘professionals’ such as lawyers and consultants. The common operational systems 
encompass, inter alia: EPFI steering committee work; EPFI (group) produced loan documentation and 
implementation guidance documents for the EP; EPFI training programmes within individual EPFIs; 
the integration of the EP into individual EPFI project finance processes; and individual EPFI reporting 
on EP implementation.  
Issue-based field structuration processes are seen to be heavily influenced and controlled by 
elite incumbents occupying key positions within the existing mature field where the issue arises, or 
which it influences. When mature field disruption or uncertainty arises because of a new issue of 
concern arising from outside the mature field - in our case, the issue of socially accountable finance 
advocated by an external NGO movement - these central actors use their powerful field positions to 
address the issue by instigating change that meets the conditions of the mature field. To achieve this, 
we propose that these actors work most effectively as a collective (in our case, as an internal 
movement) by engaging in the (re)construction of mature field rationales and logics - in our case, the 
assimilation of a community-oriented environmental and social logic into a market logic -  and the 
mobilization of resources and collective action surrounding the issue. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
  
This issue-based field structuration evolves in three key phases. First, in order to theorize the 
issue, or “problem”, and to propose a legitimate course of action to address it, the central actors in the 
mature field enlist the prevailing rationale and logic of the mature field affected by the issue. They 
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then reconstruct this rationale by assimilating the alternative ‘issue-logic’ advocated by external issue-
actors, such as NGO movements, into the prevailing logic of the mature field (Thornton et al., 2012). 
This facilitates the establishment of new issue-related institutions (in our case, the Equator Principles) 
aimed at driving some form of institutional change and represents the first stage of the issue-based 
field structuration process. This process is distinct from institutional change common in mature fields, 
where the existing field rationale(s) and logic(s) often need to be replaced as opposed to reconstructed 
in order to provoke substantive field-level change (see, Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Kitchener, 
2002; Lounsbury, 2002; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).  
 
Second, this reconstruction of rationale(s) and logic(s) assists central actors in mobilising 
collective resources and action through existing mature field networks and channels in order to diffuse 
new issue-related institutions and practices amongst potential issue-based field constituents; thus 
making these actors the political-cultural force for (issue) diffusion (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008). 
These issue-related institutions and practices – such as, in our case, the Equator Principles (EP), the 
EP steering committee, working groups, EP loan documentation processes, and EP implementation 
meetings and guidance -  simultaneously serve to initially appease those issue-related actors external 
to the mature field promoting an alternative rationale (Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Wooten & Hoffman, 
2008) as these actors perceive these institutions and practices as indicative of an initial willingness to 
address their key concerns. This represents the second stage of the issue-based field structuration 
process and whilst it is somewhat similar to the “institutional bricolage”13 that Maguire et al. (2004) 
argue occurs in the structuration of emerging fields, we propose that issue-based fields do not suffer to 
the same extent from the “liability of newness” (Maguire et al., 2004) inherent in emerging fields. 
This is because, in our case, the EP issue-based field is predominantly based upon the deeply 
engrained cultural, relational and operational systems and boundaries of the underlying mature field to 
which the issue relates. This implies that the use of existing mature field meaning systems, networks 
and channels makes the legitimacy, diffusion and enactment of new issue-based field institutions and 
practices easier than it would be in an emerging field where it is necessary to newly establish “clearly 
defined leading actors, […] a coherent discourse, structures of cooperation and domination, sets of 
accepted norms, [and] stable interorganizational relationships” (Maguire et al., 2004, p.675).  
 
                                                          
13 Bricolage represents “the creation of new practices and institutions from different elements of existing institutions” (Levi-
Strauss, 1966, cited in Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p.117).  
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Third, issue-based field structuration crystallises through the growth in diverse field 
occupants and the intensification of their interactions. Issue-based field membership is determined by 
actors’ subjective and wide-ranging relationship with the issue and it is this identification with the 
issue that brings disparate powerful and less-powerful actors into closer proximity than is likely in 
mature or emerging field structuration processes. Interactions between some of these diverse field 
members (such as the NGO and EPFI movements), through formal or less formal meetings, 
discussions and exchanges, are, at least initially, contentious. This is due to their often competing 
rationales regarding the issue, the nature and trajectory of the new issue-related institution (in our 
case, the Equator Principles), and the level of perceived change the new issue-related institution is 
instigating in the underlying mature-field logics and practice. While disparate actors occupy the issue-
based field and interact more than they would in mature field settings, the hierarchical relationships 
and power struggles existing between them (for example, between the EPFI and NGO movements) as 
they interact around the mature field are mainly transferred to the issue-based field where powerful, 
central mature field actors largely control the progression of the issue-based institution and practices 
through formalised issue-coalitions or associations (such as the EP Association). Such formalised 
forums become more sophisticated with an increase in members from the mature field as the new 
issue-related institution (the Equator Principles) continues to be diffused amongst them and they 
establish coordinated work programmes, management and governance systems. Less powerful actors 
external to the mature field to which the issue relates (such as NGO movements) can influence these 
forums through, for example, their advocacy for certain content or structural developments to the 
emergent issue-institution. However, our case suggests that this influence fluctuates over time and can 
often be limited due to resource constraints. Ultimately, continuous interaction and openness can lead 
to mutual awareness and respect developing between competing powerful and less powerful issue-
based field actors as they learn about each other’s activities and challenges. This creates the potential 
for more collaborative as opposed to combative interactions. Nevertheless, on-going disparity and 
tension between their respective rationales surrounding the issue (socially accountable project 
finance), the issue-related institution (the Equator Principles), and the practices adopted prevents this 
mutual awareness and respect from instigating more substantive change within the mature field (the 
project finance field). 
 
Van Wijk et al. (2013) assert that the ambiguity of an issue, especially new sustainability- 
related issues, may contribute to the likelihood of more collaborative work between mature field 
incumbents and less powerful competing external movements in field structuration processes. 
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However, our analysis suggests that the newness or ambiguity of an issue (such as socially 
accountable project finance) may actually facilitate a certain level of capture of the issue by powerful 
mature field incumbents who possess the necessary resources to develop issue-based institutions and 
practices which predominantly suit the rationale and logics of the mature field to which the issue 
relates. This can accentuate the combative nature of external and internal movement interactions in 
issue-based field structuration processes. Whether primarily combative or collaborative, we contend 
that such ongoing moves and counter-moves between less-powerful and powerful issue-related actors 
continuously shape issue-based field structuration and the institution(s) it supports.  
 
Our case analysis indicates that issue-based field structuration is recursively linked with the 
underlying mature field, with existing cultural, relational and operational ‘pre-conditions’ not just 
influencing the initial stages of issue-based field structuration – as may be the case with emerging 
fields (Maguire et al., 2004) – but on a continual basis. In turn, we view the issue-related institution 
(the Equator Principles), and the meaning, relational and operational systems supporting it at issue-
based field level as iteratively influencing, to varying degrees, mature field logics and practices (in our 
case, those associated with project finance) on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, we consider the issue-
based field as being “vertically” related, or subordinate, to the more authoritative mature field (see, 
Fligstein & McAdam, 2011), certainly in the initial stages of issue-based field structuration. However, 
we propose that both fields develop a more “horizontal” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011), or mutually 
dependent, relationship over time as the issue (socially accountable project finance) – and its related 
institution (the EP) - become more fully accepted and assimilated into mature field logics and 
practices.  
 
This model of issue-based field structuration could be adapted to other studies that seek a 
nuanced, contextual understanding of how sustainability-related issues, such as sustainable/socially 
accountable agriculture, forestry, fishery, mining, and tourism, affect and are affected by the mature 
fields to which they relate. It could also be mobilized to examine how separate fields can develop 
around sustainability-related issues, bringing disparate issue-related actors together in cultural, 
relational and operational contexts that develop issue-related institutions (e.g. standards, codes of 
conduct) that directly influence how the issue is interpreted and acted upon in the mature field, while 
at the same time being iteratively and recursively influenced by the infrastructure of the mature field 
over time. This accentuates the potential of field-level research to investigate fields as “sites where 
problems of organizing are debated among disparate actors [and is] integral to understanding how 
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organizations construct solutions to the problems of the twenty-first century” (Wooten & Hoffman, 
2008, p.143). 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has studied why and how commercial banks began to integrate sustainability issues 
into their project finance operations and the impact this had on the mature commercial bank project 
finance field and on commercial bank social accountability. It specifically examined the role of a non-
governmental organization (NGO) movement external to the project finance field and an incumbent 
commercial bank movement within this field in the development of the Equator Principles (EP) and 
the structuration of the EP issue-based field (Hoffman, 1999). In particular, we evidenced how the 
conflicting, collective rationales and actions of both the NGO and commercial bank movements 
surrounding the issue of socially accountable project finance acted as the basis of EP issue-based field 
structuration, and how this contentious, political process enhanced, rather than constrained, adopting 
Equator Principles Financial Institutions’ (EPFIs’) social accountability.  
 
The study makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it presents a unique account 
of the structuration of an issue-based field. Our focus advances Hoffman’s (1999) conceptualisation of 
issue-based fields, as we evidence and theorize how and why these fields evolve an institutional 
infrastructure. We proposed a model of issue-based field structuration which can be mobilized to 
inform future research into how sustainability issues impact on, and are impacted by, diverse mature 
fields. Second, we develop prior work examining the institutionalization processes surrounding the 
development of corporate social reporting and accountability. We unveil how environmental and 
social risk assessment became a key part of credit risk analysis in project finance, and how this risk 
assessment process came to be externally reported on as part of a collective (and individual) 
commercial bank effort to encourage environmental and social due diligence and socially responsible 
decision making in project finance. Specifically, we illustrate how the EP issue-based field 
structuration process originated and progressed the production of accounts of banks’ efforts to 
categorise, quantify, monitor and avoid (where possible) environmental and social risks. This develops 
our comprehension of the influence of field-level institutionalization processes on the evolution of 
corporate social and environmental reporting practices. We extend Archel et al.’s (2011) insights into 
the role of activist stakeholders in the structuration of fields focused on corporate social and 
environmental responsibility and reporting. Archel et al. (2011) contend that activist groups who 
engage in institutional processes aimed at improving corporate accountability are likely to be 
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conditioned by these processes, thereby gaining only second-order concessions. While we found 
evidence of second-order concessions from the EPFI movement, we also discovered a continual 
progression in these concessions as NGO movement engagement deepened throughout the issue-based 
field formation process. This highlights the importance of unpacking the nature of second-order 
concessions in order to reveal the extent of change, and of not automatically dismissing apparently 
non-radical concessions as insignificant. Overall, while elements of our analysis concur with Archel et 
al.’s (2011) and Cooper & Owen’s (2007) concerns about the limited potential for civil society actors 
such as NGOs to shift corporate social responsibility (and reporting) in a more challenging direction, 
we considerably nuance their conclusions by unveiling how the NGO movement influenced a 
progression in the attention afforded to these issues in a highly conservative industry sector.   
 
Third, we advance the literature on the impact of external and internal movements on 
institutional change and field structuration (e.g. Fligstein, 1996) by studying the role of NGO and 
Equator Principles financial institution (EPFI) movements in the Equator Principles issue-based field 
structuration process. In particular, we unveil how the nature of the issue fuelling movement activity 
influences these processes. In contrast to Van Wijk et al.’s (2013) contention that the ambiguity of an 
issue may contribute to more collaborative work between mature field incumbents and less powerful 
external movements in field structuration, we propose that the newness or ambiguity of an issue (such 
as socially accountable project finance) may actually facilitate a certain level of, albeit far from 
complete, capture of the issue by powerful field incumbents who possess the resources necessary to 
develop issue-based institutions and practices designed to predominantly suit their preferred rationale 
and logics.  
A number of limitations along with related opportunities for future research arise from this 
study. First, we predominantly unveil the contentious nature of (social) movement interactions in 
issue-based field structuration, but there could also be more explicitly collaborative efforts involved 
(see e.g. van Wijk et al., 2013). While we unveil some, albeit limited, evidence of collaboration in the 
later stages of our case, future research could explore how intense collaborations between external and 
internal movements can shape issue-based field structuration in order to advance our theorizations of 
how collaborative relationships may shape issue-based fields. Of particular interest would be the 
collaborative conditions under which alternative logics come to dominate, are assimilated, or are 
ignored (Thornton et al., 2012) as the institutional infrastructure of an issue-based field is constructed. 
Work of this nature could also explore how, and the extent to which, external movements who 
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collaborate extensively with internal movements become embedded in the evolving issue-based field 
institutional infrastructure as it evolves and matures. Within these extensive collaborations the extent 
to which ‘issues of concern’ come to impact upon the logics and practices pervading the mature field 
to which the issues relate could be compared with our findings. This would extend and develop our 
theorization of issue-based field structuration to more explicitly collaborative efforts between external 
and internal movements. Such a focus would also respond to Lee and Lounsbury’s (2015) recent call 
for an enhanced understanding of how movements usher new logics into fields and “provide an 
infrastructure as well as a legacy of beliefs and practices that enable logics to endure” (p. 17).  
 
The issue-based field we study specifically focuses on project finance activities in the mature 
commercial bank field, but there are other commercial bank activities that could also be addressed 
beyond project finance. For example, it is possible that the creation of the EP issue-based field and the 
infrastructure underpinning it could facilitate broader consideration and reporting of other major 
environmental and social issues by commercial banks in their lending activities beyond project 
finance. In effect, the EP issue-based field could act as a catalyst, facilitating the creation of other, 
parallel, issue-based fields around further key social and environmental issues impacting the 
commercial banking sector. For example, the issues of human rights and climate change have both 
become important topics that frequently dominate project finance/EP as well as broader commercial 
lending due diligence processes. This has resulted in efforts to better acknowledge and clarify the EPs' 
role with respect to both of these issues in the recently released third version of the EP - EP III - along 
with the emergence of individual human rights and climate change policies for broader commercial 
lending activities. Future research could explore the role of the EP issue-based field, in 'facilitating' the 
development of a human rights issue-based field, or a climate change issue-based field, existing 
alongside the existing EP issue-based field. It would be intriguing to uncover the process through 
which the structuration of these potential parallel fields draw on the existing EP issue-based field, and 
how they evolve and relate to the existing mature project finance field and broader mature commercial 
bank field.  
Given that we have focused on examining field-level processes, we have not afforded detailed 
attention to the micro-level practices that evolved within individual banks, in particular how their 
internal accounting and external reporting processes were developed as the EP issue-based field 
evolved. Future work should pay more explicit attention to the institutionalization processes at the 
organizational level in order to better explain and understand these processes. This call is consistent 
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with Greenwood, Hinings, and Whetten’s (2014) recent request for more studies examining how field-
level change influences actual organizational behavior and related change. In particular, we need to 
know more about the extent to which, and the processes underpinning how, the competing institutional 
logics we observed in this case were actually assimilated at the organizational level (see, for example, 
Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). Moreover, studies conducting comparative analyses of the nature and extent 
of change within commercial banks’ project finance credit risk analysis should help us to better 
understand the possibly heterogeneous responses of individual banks to the introduction of the EP, and 
the factors that account for any potential differences. 
 
While this paper privileges the perspectives of Equator Principles Financial Institutions 
(EPFIs) and NGOs, given their overriding influence on the process studied, it pays less attention to the 
perspectives of wider Equator Principles stakeholders such as affected communities, project finance 
clients, consultants, lawyers, and socially responsible investors. Researchers also need to seek out 
broader Equator Principles stakeholder perspectives on their experiences of the evolution of the EP, 
and EP issue-based field structuration subsequent to 2008, especially those of EPFI clients. Finally, we 
are conscious of the fact that the Equator Principles apply to a small proportion of overall commercial 
bank lending activities and that, while we have argued that they have had some positive influence on 
EPFI social accountability, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the issue of financial 
institution social accountability has taken on even greater significance. Future studies could therefore 
explore the implications of the crisis for both current and future regulatory or policy developments 
impacting on financial institution social accountability.  
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Table 1: Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
 
* These interviewees had moved to new organizations following their interviews or after they had 
been approached for interview. However, they indicated that the views expressed were 
representative of their experiences with the BankTrack member organizations in question.  
 
** Head of International Campaign on Globalisation and Environmental Issues at FoE Netherlands 
(Milieudefensie). This interviewee was involved in the drafting of the Collevecchio Declaration.  
  
 
Name of NGO 
 
Position of 
interviewee 
 
Location of 
Interview 
 
Date 
 
Interview
Duration  
 
International Rivers Network (IRN) 
 
Policy Analyst Sussex, U.K. 11/06/2006 60  
minutes 
Friends of the Earth (FoE), US 
 
 
Program Manager, 
Green Investments 
Project 
 
Sussex, U.K. 11/06/2006 65 
minutes 
Rainforest Action Network (RAN)* Former Director, 
Global Finance 
Campaign  
Sussex, U.K 11/06/2006 60 
minutes 
Friends of the Earth (FoE), Amazonia* Former Manager, 
Eco-Finance Project 
 
London 12/06/2006 60 
minutes 
Platform Researcher 
 
London 13/06/2006 75 
minutes 
Berne Declaration 
 
 
Head, Private 
Finance Programme 
 
Zurich 12/07/2006 90 
minutes 
Campagna per la Riforma della Banca 
Mondiale (CRBM) 
 
Co-ordinator  Amsterdam 03/10/2006 60 
minutes 
WWF – UK*  Former Global 
Policy Advisor 
 
Telephone 
interview 
09/10/2006 60 
minutes 
Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
Europe/International 
(formerly FoE 
 Netherlands/Milieudefensie**) 
Coordinator, 
Corporate Campaign 
FoE International 
and FoE Europe 
 
Telephone 
interview 
04/12/2006 60 
minutes 
BankTrack Coordinator Utrecht, 
Netherlands 
11/01/2008 103 
minutes 
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Table 2: Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) Interviewees  
 
EPFI designation Position held by 
interviewee 
Location of 
Interview 
Date Interview 
Duration 
Dutch EPFI 1* 
Interviewee 1 
Former Head of 
Sustainable Risk 
Management  
Amsterdam 22/05/2007 105 minutes 
Australian EPFI Chief Operating Officer London 29/05/2007 75 minutes 
Dutch EPFI 1 
Interviewee 2 
Head of Sustainability 
Worldwide 
London 
Follow up 
phone call 
29/05/2007 
07/09/2007 
64 minutes 
64 minutes 
UK EPFI 3 Head of Group Policy & 
Risk Reporting 
London 30/05/2007 
 
78 minutes 
UK EPFI 2 Senior Manager, 
Sustainability Risk 
Management 
London 17/09/2007 82 minutes 
UK EPFI 1  
Interviewee 1 
Head, Environmental Risk 
Management 
London 
Follow up 
phone call  
19/09/2007 
19/06/2009 
 
98 minutes 
60 minutes 
Dutch EPFI 1 
Interviewee 3 
Executive Director Amsterdam 25/09/2007 92 minutes 
Dutch EPFI 1 
Interviewee 4 
Head, Sustainable Risk 
Management 
Amsterdam 28/09/2007 51 minutes 
South African EPFI Head, Governance & 
Sustainability 
Telephone 
Interview 
11/12/2007 57 minutes 
US EPFI Director, Environmental & 
Social Risk Management 
Telephone 
Interview 
19/12/2007 42 minutes 
French EPFI 
Interviewee 1 
 
French EPFI 
Interviewee 2 
Head, Environmental 
Team, Capital Raising & 
Financing 
Secretariat, Sustainable 
Development Group 
Paris 15/01/2008 52 minutes 
Dutch/Belgian EPFI 
Interviewee 1 
 
 
Dutch/Belgian EPFI 
Interviewee 2 
 
Head, Environmental & 
Social Unit, Business 
Development Section 
 
Senior Risk Analyst, 
Environmental  & Social 
Unit 
Rotterdam 18/01/2008 61 minutes 
Dutch EPFI 2 Advisor, Environmental & 
Social Risk Management 
Policy 
Amsterdam 13/02/2008 61 minutes 
UK EPFI 1  
Interviewee 2 
Associate Director, 
Investment Banking 
Division: Mining & Metals 
Team 
London 
 
Follow up 
phone calls 
28/04/2008 
 
25/11/2008 
26/11/2008 
76 minutes 
 
60 minutes 
38 minutes 
Key:  
*  Numbers included beside the Equator Principles Financial Institution (EPFI) organizational names 
(e.g. UK EPFI 1, 2, 3) sequence the date the particular Equator Principles Financial Institution adopted 
the EP and not the sequence in which the interviewees were interviewed. 
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Figure 1: An issue-based field structuration process 
 
Issue-Based Field:  
Guiding institution: Issue-based  
Infrastructure: Issue-related meaning, relational & operational systems 
Occupants: Diverse issue-related actors 
 Core impact on: Mature field logics & practices 
 
 
 
 
Less powerful 
issue-related  
actor rationales/  
logics & action 
 
 
 
Mature field central actors’: 
reconstruction of established rationales/logics;  
mobilization of collective action &  
resources around the issue 
 
 
 
 
 
Mature Field: 
Established institution(s) & practices 
Infrastructure: Established meaning, relational & operational systems 
Occupants: Established members 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(4) 
(5) 
(5) 
(6) & (7) 
(8) 
 
(2) & (3) 
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Key to Figure 1: 
 
Arrows: 
 
 The complete arrow lines signify on-going direct and powerful influence. 
 
 The dotted arrow lines signify fluctuating levels of direct and/or less powerful influence over time. 
 
 The direction of an arrow indicates the direction in which influence flows. 
 
Numbers: 
1. New ‘issue of concern’ arising from external movement outside the mature field (‘less powerful 
issue-related actors’) and impacting on the mature field. 
2. ‘Mature field central actors’ assimilate the ‘issue-logic’ underpinning the ‘issue of concern’ into 
the established rationales/logic(s) of the mature field. 
3. Mature field central actors mobilize collective resources and action around the ‘issue of concern’ 
using the existing mature field networks and channels. This occurs simultaneously with 2. above. 
4. Continual interpretive struggles occur around the ‘issue of concern’ between the mature field 
central actors and less-powerful issue-related actors. 
5. The combination of 2, 3, and 4 above initiates the issue-based field structuration process which is 
underpinned by the establishment of a new issue-related institution by mature field central actors 
and an evolution in supporting practices. The emerging issue-based field is initially subordinate to 
the mature field. 
6. Intensification of formal and informal interactions between disparate powerful and less-powerful 
issue-related actors around the ‘issue of concern’. Competing logics/rationales and the level of 
change the new issue-based institution is instigating are key sources of tension arising within the 
evolving issue-based field.  
7. Increased formalisation of the issue-based field institutional infrastructure as the issue-related 
institution is diffused throughout the issue-based field. Mature field central actors largely control 
the progression of the issue-based institution and practices through, inter alia, formalised issue-
coalitions or associations. Less powerful issue-related actors exert some influence over these 
associations and practices, albeit on a fluctuating basis.  
8. The issue-based field becomes less subordinate to the mature field and iteratively influences 
mature field logics and practices in an ongoing manner. However, despite escalating mutual 
awareness and respect between mature field central actors and less-powerful issue-related actors, 
enduring differences surrounding the rationales/logics underpinning the issue, the issue-related 
institution, and the underlying practices may prevent more substantive change occurring in the 
mature field. 
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Appendix I: List of Acroynms  
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
CRBM  Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale 
EP  Equator Principles 
EPFI  Equator Principles Financial Institution 
E&S  Environmental and Social 
FI   Financial Institution 
FOE  Friends of the Earth 
IFC  International Finance Corporation 
IRN  International Rivers Network 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
RAN  Rainforest Action Network 
SPE  Special Purpose Entity  
WWF  World Wildlife Fund 
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Appendix II: The Differences between EP I and EP II 
 
Issue Equator Principles I Equator Principles II 
Eligible Parties Equator Banks Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) 
Financial Threshold $50M US $10M US 
Object of Assessment 
(Principle 1) 
Projects only Projects plus expansions and upgrades of projects if the 
environmental and social  impact of the expansion or 
upgrade is significant. 
Scope of Activities 
 (Principle 1) 
Lending Lending plus advisory activities. 
Scope of Assessment 
(For category A and B 
projects)  
(Principle 1& 2) 
Environmental assessment (EA) only. Environmental assessment plus social assessment 
(SEA). 
Streamlining 
Assessment 
(Principle 3) 
No requirement. 
 
Adopts a streamlined approach to assessment of 
environmental and social impacts to principally High-
Income OECD countries, where high standards for 
assessing environmental and social impacts and IFC 
performance standards and EHS Guidelines exist. 
Action Plan and 
Management System 
 (Principle 4) 
Environmental Management Plan 
(EMP) for A and where appropriate B 
projects. 
Action Plan (AP) and Management System for A and B 
projects. 
Consultation 
(For category A and 
where appropriate 
category B projects) 
 (Principle 5) 
In a structured and culturally 
appropriate way with project affected 
groups. Aim for broad community 
support for projects. EA and EMP to 
take account of consultations.  
In a structured and culturally appropriate way with 
project affected communities. Prior informed 
consultation (not prior informed consent) for projects 
with significant adverse impacts. Consultation process 
and results to be documented in AP.  
Grievance Procedures 
(Principle 6) 
No requirement. New requirement for borrower to establish grievance 
procedure for project affected communities throughout 
the project life cycle 
Independent Expert 
Review  (Principle 7) 
EA, EMP and consultation for category 
A projects. 
SEA and AP compliance and consultation for category A 
and where appropriate category B. 
Legal Compliance 
Covenants 
(Principle 8) 
No requirement. New requirement for borrower to comply with local, 
state and host country environmental and social  laws, 
regulations and permits in all material respects. 
Action Plan Compliance 
Covenant 
(Principle 4 & 8) 
Borrower to comply with EMP. Borrower to comply with AP (where applicable) in all 
material respects. 
Reporting Compliance 
Covenant 
(Principle 8) 
Borrower to provide regular reports 
on compliance with EMP. 
Borrower to provide regular reports of compliance with 
AP and host country laws, regulations and permits. 
Decommissioning 
Covenant 
(Principle 8) 
Borrower to decommission facilities in 
accordance with decommissioning 
Plan, where applicable. 
Same as EP I. 
Remedial Steps to 
Remedy Covenant 
Breach (Principle 8) 
Lender to engage with borrower to 
remedy non-compliance with 
covenants if borrower in default. 
EPFI reserves rights to exercise remedies for non-
compliance or default; and discretion to work with 
borrower re covenant compliance. 
Appointment of 
Independent Expert 
(Principle 9) 
Lender discretion to appoint 
independent environmental expert to 
provide additional monitoring and 
reporting services. 
EPFI to require appointment of independent 
environmental and/or social expert, or borrower to 
retain qualified and experienced external experts to 
verify its monitoring information for EPFIs over life of 
loan.  
Annual Reporting 
Obligations 
(Principle 10) 
No requirement. New requirement for at least annual reporting by EPFI 
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Appendix III: Sample of Initial Interview Analysis Coding (1) 
 
Code Type Code Name Explanation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core codes 
ACC Accountability 
CD Collevecchio Declaration 
EP I Equator Principles I 
EP II Equator Principles II 
EPFI Equator Principles Financial Institution 
FI-NGO REL Financial institution-non governmental organization 
relationships 
HIS  History/background/interviewee role & responsibilities 
INS Institutional (theory) 
LEG Legitimacy 
OC Organizational change 
PF Project finance 
RM Risk management 
STK Stakeholder (originally referring to NGOs) 
VOL Voluntary (versus regulation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample of  
sub-codes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(For) ACC 
 
Accountability 
ACC/CC Commercial confidentiality 
ACC/DEF Definitions (overlap with ACC/EPFI & ACC/NGO). 
ACC/EPFI EPFI opinions on (EP) accountability (overlap with EP/ACC). 
ACC/L Leaders  
ACC/NGO NGO opinions on (EP) accountability (overlap with EP/ACC). 
ACC/MON Monitor (as opposed to “felt responsibility”). 
ACC/RES Responsibility 
ACC/TRANS/DI
S 
Transparency, Disclosure 
 
(For) PF 
 
Project finance 
BPF Beyond project finance 
PFM Project finance market (pressures/influence, overlap with 
EP/PF later). 
 
(For) EP 
 
Equator Principles (I & II)  
 
EP/ACC Accountability 
EP/AD Adoption (objectives etc.). 
EP/BEN Benefits  
EP/CAT Catalyst (overlap with BPF). 
EP/GOV Governance (re structural requirements of the Principles & 
EPFI network/members). 
EP/IMP Implementation (guidelines, policies, training, “departments”, 
structural changes, actors, internal implementation audits etc.). 
EP/PF Project finance market (link PFM) & process (internal EPFI PF 
stages & EP integration; lawyer & external consultant 
assistance; client implementation & assessments etc. 
EP/R Revision of EP I. 
EP/S Scope (re design for ‘just project finance’ etc.). 
EP/STR Structure (requirements, some overlap with EP/S & EP/ACC). 
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample of 
Sub-codes 
(continued) 
Code name Explanation 
 
(For) EPFI 
 
Equator Principles Financial Institutions 
EPFI/C Clients (interaction/relationships, overlap with AG). 
EPFI/Con Consultants (interaction/relationships, overlap with AG). 
EPFI/LW Lawyers (interaction/relationships, overlap with AG) 
 
(For) OC 
 
Organizational Change 
OC/AG   Agents/champions. 
OC/CUL Culture (re EPFIs) 
OC/STR Structure (re EPFIs, merged into e.g. EP/IMP, EP/BEN later). 
OC/BAR Barriers (overlap with OC/CUL and merged into e.g. ACC/CC 
later). 
 
(For) RM 
 
Risk Management 
RM/BUS Business case (for EPFIs). 
RM/C Core risk management (i.e. credit, as opposed to just E&S). 
RM/Com Competition (between EPFIs) 
RM/E&S/EP E&S risk management & relationship with EP. 
 
(For) STK 
 
Stakeholders 
STK/AD Advocacy (NGO campaigns). 
STK/CC Campaign changes  
STK/E Engagement  
STK/R/P  Role & power 
STK/RD  Reputational damage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix III: Sample of Initial Interview Analysis Coding (2) 
 
